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Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20040080-CA
vs.
CHERIFF SARKIS MAHI,
Defet

ARGIJMENT
POINT I
I HE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE S TA I E COMPLIED WITH 120-DAY
DISPOSITION STATUTE AND THEREFORE WHETHER DISMISSAL WAS
APPROPRIATE WAS SUFFICIENTLY PRESERVED BELOW
. ii- State's firs 1 LHII. Il.iil M'lhi tli I HMI pivsrn r the issue of w hefliei II ' f,if
complied with the 120-day disposition statute sufficiently to trigger the trial court's duty
lo m | e o n

the proceeding, v* iiKomvl

A' <I • ^l.ilc a»ii< d h noK'd 1 ijn nulr" I preserve

an issue for appeal, it 'must be raised in a timely fashion, must be specifically raised such
that the issue is sufficiently raised fu ,i Inel .i! runs, biir.ncss hi loir llir IM;II coiui .uhl •
must be supported by evidence or relevant legal authority.'" State v. Richins, 2004 UT
App 36, f 8 (quoting State v. Schultz, 2002 UTApp (f»i>, ^ i1),, 5S IV kl X7*Ui|iioiiiiioiiN
and citations omitted)). As will be demonstrated, the 120-day disposition issue was
preserved in this case.
The State noted in its brief, before the jury was impaneled, that there was an
unrecorded bench conference ®. 165:5). After the jury was impaneled, the coi ii I:
reminded defense counsel that "[o]ne thing you wanted to address, Mr. Simms, at this
1

stage, was the 120-day notice of disposition, which was apparently filed by the defendant.
.. " ®. 165: 28). Mahi, through counsel, then presented to the court the following:
Mr. Simms [defense counsel]: These are the documents that the defendant handed
me this morning. I think his argument is that he gave the jail authorities the 120day disposition on June 20th, despite the fact that it's marked by the jail officials as
July 12,2003.
The Court: That's his position?
Mr. Simms: Yes.
The Court: Do you wish to respond, Mr. Knell?
Mr. Knell [prosecutor]: Yes, your honor. I believe my copy also says June 20th. I
guess it wasn't received by jail personnel until July 15th. However, I think there
was a good faith exception here, in that the defendant was not transported on
several occasions, at least three or four, when he wasn't transported. So I would
argue that the defendant himself has caused any undue delay.
The Court: It is clear that the date that apparently Mr. Mahi placed on the notice
was 20, June.
It is also clear that the state, or excuse me, that the jail authorities, jail
authorities placed the date of 15, July. That then creates, I suppose, an issue of
fact in that scenario, which we can not address here today.
This is the first time that it has come to my attention that we had an issue of
this nature being presented.
I'll grant you the original, or a copy of this document
was filed on July 17th in the court file. At the time the file was still winding its
way, I believe, to this court from the preliminary stages.
So without ruling on the propriety or impropriety of the motion, you have
preserved your record in that regard.
®. 165:28-30 (emphasis added)).
From this exchange it appears to be clear that the issue of whether the state had
complied with the 120-day disposition statute was sufficiently raised and addressed by all
parties present. First, there was previously an unrecorded bench conference during which
the issue was likely discussed, perhaps in even greater detail, and that the Court was
aware of the issue evidenced by the trial judge's specific reminder to defense counsel of
the one thing he wanted to address- the 120-day notice of disposition. ®. 165:5).
Second, the State also clearly understood the 120-disposition issue was before the
2

court and therefore addressed the merits of the argument. Specifically, the state implicitly
argue i =

: c case si

be dismissed because the delays should be attributed to the

defendant who was not transported for several previous hearings. ®. 165: 29).
Final

Court manifested its eiear understanding oi l ^ 120-day disposition

issue raised by Mahi by recognizing the discrepancy between the date Mahi plated on (In
notice In I vltlu ami the date he claimed to have delivered it to the jail authorities, and the
date marked by the jail authorities on the notice as having been received. ®. 165: 29).
specifically recognized this created an issue of fact that it could not
address that day and stated that ''without ruling on the propriety or impropriety of the
motion sou Iia\e preserved your record ii i that regard, Mi Sininis/" fc j65:2030(emphasis added)).
II ni * 11. in 111. i. I,In 11 Ids I "I 11;is disposition motion, including the implicit
consequence of dismissal for the State's alleged failure to comply with the statute, was
"sufl u ••/!

.

of conscioi isness before 11, le trial COUP - - lhatthe trial

judge recognized it was addressing a motion and that the issue was preserved for the
'h'ufttl A7j/r v Ittrhn" '(Mil " " I \|ij -e }\ K (quolmg State v. Schultz, )M\1 11 I' App
366, TJ19, 58 P.3d 879 (quotations and citations omitted)). Furthermore, the issue raised
was "si lpported b\ e\ idence oi i ek ( ""ai it k gal ai itl IOI it> " > ' 1 lie 1 I, it i this case, was Mahi's
claims that he delivered the 120-day notice prior to the day marked on it by the jail
authorities and the date o ( lime MI1" on \Uy iim-iimi/nt * \\^vi<\ b^ N lain. (/,/.) 1 he State's
argument that this issue was not preserved is, therefore, without merit.
POINT II
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE 120-DAY DISPOSITION PERIOD HAD
LAPSED PRIOR TO TRIAL IS IN PART A FACTUAL DETERMINATION
WHICH THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE AND WHICH IS
NECESSARY FOR A MEANINGFUL APPELLATE REVIEW
3

The State next claims that regardless of whether the 120-day disposition issue was
preserved, the defendant was tried within the 120-disposition period and was therefore
not entitled to dismissal of the information. This argument, however, is without sufficient
support in the record to be upheld. As set out above, there remained an undecided issue
of fact that the trial court implicitly correctly recognized would have a direct bearing on
the issue of whether the State had complied with the 120-day statute. ®. 165:29). That
undecided issue is when was the 120-day notice delivered to the jail authorities? Was it,
as Mahi claimed, the date on which he signed the notice and claims to have delivered it to
the jail authorities, or was it the date on the top of the notice placed there by the jail
authorities as having been received?
The answer to this question bears directly on the question of whether the State
complied with the 120-day disposition statute requiring the Slate to bring the defendant to
trial within 120 days of the date the notice was delivered to jail authorities. The trial
court correctly recognized this discrepancy as creating an issue of fact, the determination
of which was necessary to the resolution of the issue. Unfortunately, however, the trial
court simply stated that it was an issue that could not be addressed that day and "without
ruling on the propriety or impropriety of the motion" the record had been preserved. ®.
165:29-30).
Such a situation leaves this Court in the position of having to make findings of fact
that are necessary to the determination of an issue preserved below but not ruled upon.
As this Court has set forth time and time again factual determinations are the exclusive
purview of the fact finder (in this case the trial judge) which is in a better position of
hearing the relevant evidence personally, observing the demeanor of the witnesses, and
assessing their credibility or lack thereof. American Fork City v. Singleton, 57 P.3d 1124,
4

1125-1126 (Utah App. 2002)(quotations and citations omitted)(See also South Salt Lake
City v. Terhelson, 2002 UT.App. 405, ^{16, 61 P.3d 282 (Utah.App. 2002). It is for this
reason that the State's argument that Mahi was tried within the 120-day disposition period
cannot prevail- because this Court cannot come to that conclusion without the aid of a
proper proceeding and appropriate factual findings below.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated in the original brief, Mahi asks
this Court to reverse his conviction and/or remand his case to the district court to make
specific findings of fact regarding the issue of when the 120-day disposition notice was
delivered to jail authorities in order to reach a proper resolution of his claim that the State
did not bring him to trial in a timely manner as prescribed by statute.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of July, 2005.

*atrick V. Lindsa;
Counsel for Appellant
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